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Multiple rotation-based transformation (MRBT) was 
introduced recently for mitigating the apriori-knowledge 
independent component analysis (AK-ICA) attack on 
rotation-based transformation (RBT), which is used for 
privacy-preserving data clustering. MRBT is shown to 
mitigate the AK-ICA attack but at the expense of data 
utility by not enabling conventional clustering. In this 
paper, we extend the MRBT scheme and introduce an 
augmented rotation-based transformation (ARBT) 
scheme that utilizes linearity of transformation and that 
both mitigates the AK-ICA attack and enables 
conventional clustering on data subsets transformed using 
the MRBT. In order to demonstrate the computational 
feasibility aspect of ARBT along with RBT and MRBT, we 
develop a toolkit and use it to empirically compare the 
different schemes of privacy-preserving data clustering 
based on data transformation in terms of their overhead 
and privacy. 
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I. Introduction 
Data mining has grown to include powerful tools for 
understanding unknown patterns in huge amounts of data and 
benefits by drawing ideas from several fields including 
machine learning, artificial intelligence, pattern recognition, 
statistics, and database systems [1]. Though the data mining 
area itself is young compared to other areas, it utilizes smart 
and powerful algorithms which are adapted from other areas, 
particularly from the database systems research area. These 
smart algorithms are essential for understanding data and 
building models over it, which is a fundamental goal in many 
business intelligence related areas [2]. For instance, it is 
possible to improve the quality of services by utilizing  
patterns of interests using association role mining [3] or data 
clustering [4], [5]. Also, it is very possible to build predictive 
models for learning the data by applying the data classification 
and Bayesian models among other data mining algorithms [6]. 
While the benefits realized by making data available for the 
purpose of data mining are great, recent results have shown that 
privacy is a significant requirement that must be considered 
along with the data mining results [3]. For ethical and technical 
reasons, data providers who provide their data for data mining 
purposes are concerned that their data will not be used for 
breaching their privacy. For that reason, several privacy- 
preserving data mining algorithms have been crafted since the 
initiation of privacy-preserving data mining studies in [3]. 
These algorithms are designed to provide data mining results 
over data that conceals or limits access to user identity or data 
that might lead to user identification. Also, these algorithms 
have broadened to include most of the known conventional 
data mining algorithms and consider the mining of data stored 
at distributed settings for both vertically and horizontally 
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distributed databases while considering several adversarial 
settings [7].  
Recently, privacy-preserving data clustering has been studied 
for its promising variety of applications in different fields. 
Privacy-preserving data clustering is a special clustering problem 
concerned by group data into exclusive sets according to some 
similarity criterion without breaching the data privacy. To enable 
this type of clustering, several algorithms have been introduced 
with specific advantages and disadvantages. For instance, 
Oliveira and others in [5] and Chen and others in [8] 
simultaneously introduced the rotation-based transformation 
(RBT) method in which the data is linearly (and orthogonally) 
transformed while maintaining a distance-invariance property 
between data records. This distance-invariance property enables 
an accurate distance-based clustering over transformed data. 
Though it is computationally feasible, the RBT was shown by 
Guo and others in [9] to be vulnerable to the apriori-knowledge 
independent component analysis (AK-ICA) attack. To mitigate 
this attack, Mohaisen and others introduced a multiple rotation-
based transformation (MRBT) algorithm [4]. Though the 
MRBT mitigates the AK-ICA attack and allows several distance-
based algorithms including special kinds of clustering, it does not 
enable the conventional clustering on the transformed data [4].  
The original contribution of this paper is twofold. First, to 
enable the conventional clustering on data subsets to be 
transformed using MRBT where conventional clustering was 
not previously possible, we introduce an augmented rotation- 
based transformation (ARBT) scheme which is shown to be 
efficient for data transformation while mitigating the AK-ICA 
attack. As a related contribution, we provide an optimization 
technique which uses the fact that some data is already 
clustered when applying ARBT and use that for improving the 
conventional clustering. Second, since both RBT and MRBT 
are shown theoretically to preserve privacy and to be practical 
without any empirical evidence or verification, we introduce 
ppCD, a Java-based toolkit that is designed and used for 
privacy-preserving data clustering and for performing real 
measurements for the known clustering algorithms on a typical 
computing machine. Particularly, ppCD incorporates the RBT, 
MRBT, and ARBT for privacy-preserving data clustering. Also, 
it implements a conventional clustering algorithm, namely the 
k-mean clustering algorithm, and an optimized clustering 
algorithm designed specifically for and benefiting from the 
application scenario of the ARBT. Among the interesting 
results realized in this article, we show that transforming    
130 MB of storage on a desk requires about 1.6 seconds on a 
typical computing machine with any of the transformation 
algorithms we tested in our experiments. 
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. In section 
II, we introduce the preliminaries of this work by touching 
upon the system and data model, data clustering, and data 
transformation methods for privacy-preserving data clustering. 
In section III, we introduce our augmented rotation-based 
transformation (ARBT) scheme for data clustering 
accompanied by an enhanced version of the k-mean clustering 
algorithm which benefits from the settings of ARBT. In section 
IV, we evaluate the ARBT in terms of privacy preservation, its 
security, and overhead. In section V, we introduce our empirical 
study on the different transformation schemes preceded by 
developing an evaluation criteria and depiction of the ppCD 
toolkit. Finally, we draw concluding remarks in section VI. 
II. Preliminaries 
In this section, we describe the models used in this article: 
the system model and the data model. We describe user 
classification. We define data and, finally, give a description of 
the rotation-based transformation algorithms. 
1. Models 
A. System Model  
General data mining systems are designed for mining data 
according to two different models: the server to server (S2S) 
model and the client to server (C2S) model [10]. In this work, 
we consider the C2S model which is depicted in Fig. 1. The 
C2S model consists of three entities: data providers, warehouse 
servers, and mining servers [10]. Data providers provide data 
for clustering and are simply the users whose data is of interest 
to a potential attacker. The warehouse servers are storage 
servers available publicly and accessible by both users and 
mining servers. Generally, warehouse servers are not trusted, 
and access to them is not controlled by any authentication or 
authorization services. Finally, the mining servers are used for 
mining data. Accordingly, mining servers may act maliciously. 
In the general C2S model, servers do not have direct interaction 
with users though they gain access to a user’s data by 
requesting it from the warehouse server. In principle, having 
the warehouse server in the system does not imply any 
additional security constraints over the scenario of having a 
miner communicate with users directly. For simplicity, we 
merge both the mining server and warehouse server in a single 
miner entity where the mining server initially gains access to 
data by requesting it from the user.  
The ARBT algorithm is a special case. Some interaction 
takes place between the data miner and the users (clients) to 
enable conventional clustering. Further details on all possible 
interactions between users and the mining server concerning 
the different algorithms are shown in Table 1. In Table 1, UA 
and UB stand for two users (clients) and M stands for the  
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Fig. 1. System model in general data mining application. Note
that the directions of arrows here are illustrative, and the
notation in Table 1 is considered for each algorithm
separately. 
Clients (users) Mining server
Warehouse server 
 
Table 1. Communication between users and miner where → and ↔
represent uni- and bi-directional, respectively. 
Algorithm UA, UB UA, M UB, M 
RBT → → → 
MRBT ↔ → → 
ARBT ↔ ↔ ↔ 
 
mining server. A single-user system scenario is realized by 
considering either of the users, and a multi-user system 
scenario is realized by considering both of them. 
B. User Classification 
Users are either honest or dishonest [11]. Honest users 
provide their data for mining purposes and do not have any 
interest in breaching the privacy of other users participating in 
the protocol by trying to gain access to their private data. 
Dishonest users may misbehave and seek access to the private 
data of others by reconstructing it using secret parameters of 
users participating in the protocol. In this work, we assume all 
users to have a high incentive to act honestly. Work in [12] 
suggests the rationale of such assumption. 
C. Data Model 
For data representation, we use the conventional relational 
database model to store the data [13]. In this model, dataset A 
consists of n records and a attributes. The index of a record is 
denoted as i where 1≤i≤n and the index of an attribute is 
denoted as j where 1≤j≤a. The data in our system is numerical 
and describes geographical, locational, or financial data. A 
sample of the data used in our implementation is shown in 
Table 2, and its normalized image is shown in Table 3. 
Mathematically, dataset A is represented as (aⅹn) matrix. 
2. Data Clustering 
Given dataset A of n records and a attributes, and given a  
Table 2. Sample of dataset we use in our implementation. 
Index A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 
1 13.70 48.13 084.63 41.19 66.25 
2 26.26 49.01 121.37 45.79 81.87 
3 20.76 44.98 108.12 56.59 93.31 
4 15.19 50.53 063.30 42.19 60.88 
Table 3. Dataset in Table 1 normalized to unit. Note that, this data is 
normalized along with larger dataset (50,000 records). 
Index A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 
1 0.3623 0.0170 0.3239 0.1114 0.0156 
2 0.6450 0.0198 0.6752 0.2340 0.0760 
3 0.5430 0.0072 0.5214 0.3238 0.2179 
4 0.1982 0.0245 0.3656 0.0692 0.0288 
 
 
similarity measure among these records, the data clustering is 
concerned with dividing the dataset into groups (data subsets) 
so that the records in one group (named cluster) are more 
similar to one another, and data records in separate clusters are 
less similar to one another. The Euclidean distance is a 
commonly used similarity measure in the continuous data 
clustering. The Euclidean distance between two records ři= (ri1, 
…, ria) and řj = (rj1,…, rja) is Dist(ři, řj)=(Σ ak=1 (rik–rjk)2)1/2. 
Some of the known distance-based clustering algorithms that 
utilize Euclidean distance include the k-mean algorithm [14] 
and k-nearest-neighbor (k-NN) algorithm [15]. In this article, 
we use the k-mean algorithm for comparing the performance of 
the different transformation schemes. A slightly modified    
k-mean clustering algorithm is depicted in Fig. 3. 
3. Data Transformation Algorithms 
In the context of data clustering, both privacy and data 
mining results are equally important criteria. In order to 
guarantee both criteria, several methods were introduced 
considering several potential applications (for example, [16]-
[19]); most noticeably, data perturbation. One of these 
perturbation methods is the RBT in which the data is 
transformed geometrically while preserving the distance 
between the data records to enable a distance-based data 
clustering with high accuracy that reflexes a minimal data loss 
when performing clustering. Considering several attackers’ 
capabilities, several studies are introduced to test the privacy 
achieved in the RBT scheme. For instance, it was shown that a 
combination of reconstruction and distance-based inference 
attacks can be utilized to greatly breach the privacy of the RBT. 
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The principle component analysis (PCA) [20] and independent 
component analysis (ICA) [21], two statistical tools, are shown 
to be efficient for reconstructing private data transformed using 
RBT under some operation conditions. In this section, we 
describe the RBT scheme and the attack on it followed by the 
MRBT used for mitigating this attack. Also, we provide 
motivation for our ARBT scheme by showing shortcomings of 
the MRBT. 
A. RBT 
The RBT is a distance-invariant transformation method. For 
a dataset A and R represented as an aⅹn matrix and an aⅹa 
transformation matrix, respectively, the RBT is mathematically 
expressed as Y=RA. In order to satisfy the distance-invariant 
property, the transformation matrix R needs to be orthonormal. 
R is said to be orthonormal if R=R–1 (that is, RRT=I, where I is 
the identity matrix). According to [5], [8], and [20], an 
orthonormal matrix can be constructed as a square matrix with 
two non-zero values in each row and column. An example of 
that is R = [č1, č2], where č1 and č2 are column vectors and 
defined as č1 = (cosθ, –sinθ) and č2 = (sinθ, cosθ). As an 
elementary representation, a 2×2 orthonormal matrix can be 
represented as R=f(θ)=[eij], where eij = cosθ iff i=j, eij = sinθ iff 
i<j, and eij = –sinθ iff i>j. An aⅹa orthonormal matrix, where a 
is an even number, is expressed in terms of a 2×2 orthonormal 
matrix as a diagonal block matrix R = [Ri] where 1≤ i ≤ a/2 
and R1 = R2 = … = Ra/2 [4]. For odd numbers of attributes, the 
last attribute can be transformed manually with any other 
previously transformed attribute [5]. 
RBT is shown to be vulnerable to the AK-ICA attack. The 
ICA itself is a statistical tool used for signal separation. Given the 
rotated data and a previously known portion of original private 
data, with the help of the ICA, the attacker is able to estimate the 
unknown private data from the rotated data. This attack has been 
studied in [9] and mitigated in [4]. The mitigation procedure tries 
to harden the applicability of the AK-ICA by defining several 
rotation parameters and partitioning the dataset into several data 
subsets. Then, the data subsets are rotated using rotation matrices 
generated from the different rotation parameters independently 
and released for data mining purposes. The detailed procedure of 
mitigation is shown below. 
B. MRBT 
The MRBT for the mitigating AK-ICA attack uses the long-
standing technique of controlling data release to achieve higher 
privacy. Since the column-wise control of release that provides 
distance preservation between data columns is useless for data 
clustering, which is basically performed over rows (records), 
we use the row-wise control for limiting data release. In the 
row-wise control, we block each set of records and transform 
them independently using different transformation parameters. 
In particular, we group the different records into different 
groups and rotate them using different rotation matrices 
generated by different random instances according to the 
previously mentioned method. This control of transformation 
and data release preserves full distance over records for parts of 
the columns. In particular, this distance enables correct 
clustering over the subsets. MRBT is performed as follows [4]. 
1. The data owner normalizes the data to the unit. 
2. According to some parameter m, the data owner divides 
the data into m equal parts defined as A= {A1,…, Am}. A is 
expressed as the block matrix A= [Ai]: 1≤i≤m. 
3. The data owner generates m different random seeds (s1,…, 
sm). Using each seed si, the data owner generates an 
orthogonal matrix Ri=f(si) (as detailed in section II.3.A) for 
transforming the corresponding sub-matrix of A.  
4. The data owner transforms his data as Y=[Yi]=[RiAi], 
where 1≤i≤m and releases Y for data clustering purpose. 
The resulting rotation preserves the inner product between 
the corresponding records in the original data. Also, it preserves 
the inner product between two records falling into the same 
corresponding subsets. However, the inner product is not 
preserved for records other than those mentioned here. The first 
part can be easily proven to be correct given that these records 
are transformed using the same matrix. Similarly, we prove the 
second part as follows. Let YA=[YAi]=[RiAi] and YB =[YBj]= 
[RjBj]. The inner product between YA and YB is YATYB = [YAiT YBj], 
where 1≤i≤m and 1≤j≤m. For the diagonal part of this product 
matrix (i=j), it is easy to verify the preservation of the inner 
product since YAiTYBj = (RiAi)TRiBi = AiTRiTRiBi = AiTIBi = AiTBi. 
In spite of mitigating the AK-ICA attack, which is a great 
merit [4], the MRBT does not allow conventional clustering on 
data that belongs to two different subsets. To enable that, we 
introduce an ARBT for conventional clustering of transformed 
data and its privacy. 
III. ARBT 
In order to overcome the shortcoming of the MRBT, we 
introduce the ARBT scheme that takes both conventional 
clustering and privacy into account. The ARBT consists of two 
parts applied separately on the side of the client (data owner) 
and the server. Before detailing both parts, we motivate for the 
ARBT by introducing the linearity property of transformation. 
1. Motivation 
The linearity of the RBT is an interesting property that can be 
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used for enabling conventional clustering over data 
transformed using the MRBT. Let R1= f(θ1), R2 = f(θ2), and   
R3 = f(θ3). We state that R1R2 = R3 if θ1 + θ2 = θ3, where f is a 
function that constructs an orthogonal matrix from a random 
seed θ according to the procedure explained earlier. Proving 
this statement for 2×2 transformation matrices is direct and can 
be easily generalized to an orthonormal transformation matrix 
of any size. Let R1 = [ř11, ř 12] and R2 = [č21, č22], where      
ř11 = (cosθ1, sinθ1) and ř 12 = (–sinθ1, cosθ1) are row vectors of 
R1, and č21 = (cosθ2, – sinθ2) and č22 = (sinθ2, cosθ2) are column 
vectors of R2. The product, R3 = R1R2 = [ř31, ř32], is         
řiřj = cos(θ1+θ2) = cosθ3 if i = j, řiřj = sin(θ1+θ2) = sinθ3 if i<j 
and ři řj = –sin(θ1+θ2) = –sinθ3 when i>j, from which we 
conclude the soundness of the claim.                            
Since any diagonal block matrix such as the one used in 
ARBT is also orthonormal, the above statement can be 
generalized to transformation of any size. Given this linearity 
property, now we explain the ARBT by discussing the 
procedure performed at the client and server sides, respectively. 
Given the linearity property, our goal can be achieved in a 
straightforward manner: if we are given two datasets that are 
transformed using two different parameters, we can make 
them look as though they are transformed using a single 
parameter, and hence maintain distance invariance property 
over their records using the unification property that utilizes 
linearity.  
2. Client Side 
The procedure of the ARBT at the client side consists of 
three phases. Two of these phases are performed for rotating 
the data initially and are typically the same as the procedure 
performed in the MRBT scheme. On the other hand, the third 
phase is performed when clustering results are to be computed 
over two data subsets using the conventional clustering method. 
In the description below, we consider a single user model 
though it should be clear that extension to a multi-user model is 
straightforward as shown in [4]. The three different phases of 
the client side are detailed in Fig. 2. 
3. Server Side 
The data miner follows the same procedure as in MRBT in 
response to steps 1 and 2 of the client side: the server will be 
able to learn clusters over each data subset separately [4]. 
However, after the client performs step 3 and releases the 
parameter θij upon the server’s request, the server performs the 
following. First, the server computes aⅹa orthonormal matrix 
Rij. Then, assuming that Ai is the least transformed data set, the 
server computes Yi*=RijYi, constructs the block matrix Y= 
[Yi*,Yj], and learns the clusters over Y. Note that the parameter  
 
Fig. 2. Description of the client side procedure in ARBT. 
1. Initialization: Data is divided and transformation
parameters are generated as follows: 
a. Data owner with dataset A as a×n matrix divides A
vertically into m block-matrices, where each has
c=(n/m) records (where c>a). A is then notated as
A=[Ai]. 
b. The data owner generates m different seeds s1,…,sm
and computes R1 = f(s1),…, Rm = f(sm), where Ri is an
a×a orthonormal matrix. Each Ri is associated with Ai
with the same index. 
2. Data rotation and release: Each block-matrix is
transformed independently and released to the miner.
That is, the data owner computes and publishes YA =
[YAi], where YAi = RiAi. Note that mining is only possible
on records in each subset (as in MRBT scheme [4]). 
3. Further data release: Upon request, the data owner
computes and releases parameters that make clustering on
records that belong to two different subsets possible. For
two datasets, Ai and Aj, transformed using Ri and Rj,
which are defined as Ri = f(θi) and Rj = f(θj), the user
computes and releases θij 
, ,
360 ( ), .
j i j i
ij
i j i j
θ θ θ θθ θ θ θ θ
− >⎧⎪= ⎨ − − >⎪⎩
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Description of the modified k-mean clustering algorithm 
used to cluster two subsets transformed by ARBT. 
This algorithm takes Yi* and Yj as two clustered subsets and
computes a single set of clusters over their merged dataset.
Recall that the two subsets are unified according Fig. 2. 
1. For each cluster C in data subset Yi* with a centroid Ce
a. Compute the distance between Ce and the
centroid of different clusters in the subset Yj. 
b. Add the data records of the cluster C to the
cluster in Yj that has the closest direct (that is,
Euclidian) distance to Ce. 
2. Lloyd algorithm: For each record in each cluster in the
merged clusters set in step 1: 
a. Compute the distance between the record in
question and the centroid of each cluster in the
merged set of clusters.  
b. Attach the record to the cluster that has the
closest direct distance to it (with respect to the
cluster’s centroid). 
c. Re-compute the centroid of updated cluster as the
average of data records in that cluster. 
d. Repeat step 2 until no (or almost no) records
move out of their current cluster. 
 
 
θij always unifies the transformation of data subset Ai to Aj in a 
clock-wise direction.  
Now, in order to exploit the fact that both of the data subsets 
are already clustered, we introduce a method that reduces the 
overall clustering overhead in terms of computation in our 
ARBT scheme. To achieve that, we introduce a modified 
clustering algorithm by assuming that the number of clusters to 
be learned from the whole dataset which results from merging 
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the two subsets is same as the number of clusters computed 
over each of the two subsets separately.  
In our modified clustering algorithm, we consider one of the 
two subsets as an initial set of clusters (either Yi, after its 
transformation into Yi,* or Yj itself). After that, we add the 
different records into one among the different clusters 
according to their distance to that cluster’s centroid. Then, a 
Lloyd procedure is performed for stabilizing the final clusters. 
The procedure of the modified algorithm is in Fig. 3. 
Note that step 2d considers a stop criterion of iterations 
which is realized after a constant number of iterations or real 
monitoring of the change in each cluster.  
IV. Theoretical Evaluation of ARBT 
In this section, we evaluate the ARBT. We consider both 
privacy and security of the scheme under possible threats. For 
privacy, we consider how much benefit the ARBT exposes 
for an attacker by revealing larger subsets of data that enables 
higher accuracy when applying AK-ICA. For security, we 
study how linear regression can be used for reconstructing 
original transformation parameters and point out the number 
of operation times at which the ARBT is considered safe. We 
further evaluate the resource requirements of ARBT in terms 
of computation, communication, and additional memory, if 
any. 
1. Privacy Evaluation 
The privacy achieved in the MRBT basically depends on the 
number of data subsets, m, according to which the whole 
dataset is divided. In ARBT, in order to enable conventional 
clustering, we merge different subsets as if they are 
transformed using a single transformation parameter. Therefore, 
the ARBT directly reduces m, which is an essential parameter 
for the degree of mitigation of the AK-ICA attack. That is, 
reducing m will directly reduce the mitigation of the AK-ICA 
attack achieved in MRBT. As pointed out in [4], both AK-ICA 
and MRBT are data-driven algorithms. For instance, the AK-
ICA attack may work efficiently on data with Gaussian 
distribution while it works less efficiently on data with 
geometrical distribution. Also, the MRBT can mitigate the AK-
ICA attack greatly with smaller m for some data distributions 
while other distributions require larger m at the expense of data 
utility [4]. Therefore, given a mitigation level of the AK-ICA to 
be achieved in the ARBT on a specific dataset, we can 
certainly compute and experimentally verify the minimum m 
and the maximum allowed number of data subsets to be 
merged in a single subset at average. This aspect is verified in 
our experimentation on the Banker dataset used in [4]. 
2. Security Evaluation 
To illustrate the security issue related to ARBT, consider the 
following example. Let A1, A2, and A3 be three different 
datasets and their transformed images be Y1, Y2, and Y3. 
Assume that the released parameters for further transformation 
in ARBT are θ12, θ13, and θ23 which are released for computing 
R12, R13, and R23, respectively. Using these parameters, we can 
compute the following linear system of equations (a) θ12=    
θ2 – θ1, (b) θ13= θ3 – θ1, and (c) θ23= θ3 – θ2. One can easily 
check the solvability of this system by observing that the 
system consists of three linearly independent equations in three 
variables from which the attacker can break the security of the 
original RBT. To prevent that, we limit the released parameters 
so that they can not be used for recovering the original 
transformation parameters. For instance, releasing m–1 
parameters that construct m–1 linearly independent equations is 
considered safe.  
Note that the transformation to unify more than two datasets 
can be safely performed as well since it is not necessarily 
required to release parameters to unify all of the m–1 pairs of 
two basic data subsets unification. Also, note that the ARBT is 
basically designed for data of limited use under the assumption 
that data collected for clustering purpose will not be of interest 
once clusters are learned from it. However, we can strengthen 
the ARBT for permanent data by reapplying the procedure in 
Fig. 2 periodically and changing the initial parameters so their 
revelation will not affect the scheme. 
Though our scheme does not provide any guarantee against 
colluding mining servers since we assume a single miner 
motivated by our application settings, users can wisely release 
parameters so that colluding servers don’t breach their privacy 
through these parameters. If users respond with unification 
parameters for each requesting server, the utility of our scheme 
will degrade linearly in relation with the number of miners at 
worst. On the other hand, if the user limits the set of parameters 
that she would like to release, the utility can be maintained as 
high as in the single server model.  
Note that the security analyzed as per the example in this 
section implies two party settings (single user and single miner) 
while three-party settings can be either with two miners and 
one user (as in the case above) or two users and one miner. The 
later case of three-party settings is similar to the two party case 
since we assume honest and trusted users. Though this 
assumption is not the optimal desirable form of separation 
between users, it has been used and advocated for applications 
in literature such as the one in [6]. 
3. Overhead Evaluation 
While the memory required in the ARBT scheme is the same 
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as in RBT and MRBT, additional computation is required for 
learning clusters over unified data subsets, and communication 
is required for exchanging additional parameters. Since the 
client generates an additional parameter, θij, and passes it to the 
mining server to compute Rij communication required for 
transferring, this parameter is constant per single ARBT 
operation. Computation required for computing clusters over 
the unified data is shown in section V where we suggest 
methods to reduce the overhead required in the naive scenario 
with MRBT. The extra overhead required for generating an 
orthonormal matrix of unification on the server is negligible 
compared to the processing required for clustering tasks. 
While in ARBT one of the two subsets is transformed in the 
further release step, both subsets are transformed in the naive 
scenario using a single transformation parameter. At the server 
side, while the ARBT reduces the overhead of clustering by 
considering previously clustered subsets as initial clusters, the 
naive scenario necessitates clustering with initially empty 
clusters with more overhead. Further details on this note are 
shown in experiment 10. 
V. Empirical Study 
Here we introduce an empirical study on privacy-preserving 
data clustering. Though the overhead of the client is probably 
the most essential element in the context of PPDM feasibility 
and applicability, this study considers the overhead consumed 
of the client and server to compare the different schemes fairly. 
1. Evaluation Criteria 
In this study, we develop two criteria for evaluating the 
different schemes. These criteria are resources consumption 
(that is, overhead) and the achieved privacy. While the 
overhead is mainly expressed as time of computation, the 
achieved privacy is evaluated based on the degree of mitigation 
to the AK-ICA attack. The two criteria used are detailed as 
follows. 
A. Overhead 
We study the overhead required on the client and the server 
sides. Concerning the client, we evaluate the overall 
computation overhead required for data transformation in the 
different schemes. We also consider the additional overhead 
required for both the MRBT and ARBT as they differ from the 
conventional RBT scheme. On the server side, we evaluate the 
computation overhead required for clustering different sets of 
data. We also study the impact of initial centroids’ selection on 
the required computation overhead in term of iterations and 
time. All measurements for the overhead evaluation are 
computed using the privacy-preserving data clustering (ppCD) 
toolkit. 
B. Privacy 
We study the privacy achieved using the different 
transformation schemes based on their mitigation to the AK-
ICA attack. For ARBT, since the transformation part of ARBT 
is performed at the server side, we study both privacy and 
overhead for different percents of pairs of subsets that are 
transformed using the ARBT in order to enable conventional 
clustering. 
2. Overview of ppCD 
The Java-based ppCD toolkit implements RBT, ARBT, and 
MRBT. It also implements several normalization procedures 
such as unary-norm, z-norm, and min-max norm. It also 
incorporates different clustering methods, including the k-mean 
clustering algorithm, k-nearest-neighbor clustering algorithm, 
and a modified k-mean clustering algorithm which is designed 
specifically for the ARBT scheme. The functional client of 
ppCD, depicted in Fig. 4, takes raw data, normalizes it using 
the user’s inputs for a normalization procedure, enables users to 
input transformation parameters (or assign them at random), 
and transforms data according to the selected algorithm. 
The functional server enables the administrator to load 
transformed data for processing, select a clustering algorithm, 
supply parameters for the clustering algorithm, and compute 
the clusters over the transformed data using the selected 
algorithm. The server also provides the capabilities of 
computing statistical properties on the transformed data and 
save them along with the computed clusters. A functional 
description of the server side is depicted in Fig. 5. 
The data used in our implementation and experiments 
includes real and synthetic data. The real data, which was also 
used in [4], is the Banker dataset which consists of 50,000 
 
 
Fig. 4. Client module of the ppCD. 
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Fig. 5. Server module of the ppCD. 
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Table 4. Datasets. ‘Size’ stands for the theoretically computed size as
double data type, ‘Size (d)’ stands for the size on the desk,
and ‘time’ stands for the time required for rotating the
corresponding dataset on the experimentation machine. 
Set Record Attribute Type Size Size (d) Time (ms)
s1 3,125 4 num 100 170 2.147
s2 6,250 4 num 200 338 4.088
s3 9,375 4 num 300 507 5.037
s4 12,500 4 num 400 677 8.005
s5 15,625 4 num 500 847 10.060
s6 18,750 4 num 600 1,016 12.060
s7 21,875 4 num 700 1,186 14.041
s8 25,000 4 num 800 1,356 15.963
s9 28,125 4 num 900 1,525 18.025
s10 31,250 4 num 1,000 1,697 20.029
s11 34,357 4 num 1,100 1,868 21.814
s12 37,500 4 num 1,200 2,035 23.871
s13 40,625 4 num 1,300 2,205 25.822
s14 43,750 4 num 1,400 2,376 27.974
s15 46,875 4 num 1,500 2,546 30.220
 
 
Fig. 6. Mean time required for transforming different datasets.
The time linearly depends on the number of records. 
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records. Our synthesis data consists of 106 records and was 
generated using a random generator with specific distribution 
(details are in experiment 4). To trace the precise impact of data 
size on the different criteria in the different schemes, we divide 
the Banker dataset incrementally as shown in Table 4. 
3. Empirical Study 
To study the feasibility of the different RBT schemes 
 
Fig. 7. Raw time measurements of time required for MRBT on 
dataset s10 for 500 times (rounds). 
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Fig. 8. Filtered time measurements of time required for MRBT on 
s10 applied for 500 times. 
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empirically, we use our ppCD toolkit. In our experiments, we 
consider the overhead required by the client and server alike. 
We compare the different schemes in term of their resource 
consumption and privacy achieved as detailed in the following 
experiments. Note that all of the experiments are performed on 
a computing machine equipped with an Intel Core 2 Quad 
CPU that utilizes a 32-bit data bus and operates at 2.5 GHz 
with 3.25 GB of RAM. 
Experiment 1. In this experiment, we measure the average 
time required for transforming different datasets according to 
the RBT scheme in section II.3.A. For different datasets 
(shown in Table 4), we execute RBT and measure the required 
computation. As expected, we found that, on average, the 
required computation time linearly depends on the number of 
records as shown in Table 4 and rendered in Fig. 6. 
Experiment 2. In this experiment, we tried to maximize the 
accuracy of the time measurement in the MRBT case. Because 
the ppCD toolkit shares the computing machine’s resources 
with other running processes, measured time in an experiment 
may not be as accurate as needed. To eliminate the error in 
measurement that results from this scenario, we run the MRBT 
on s10 500 times and measure the execution time (shown in Fig. 
7). We observed that some of the measured times are greatly 
higher than the majority of measurements. For higher accuracy, 
we filtered these ambiguous measurements and replaced them 
with the average measurements (shown in Fig. 8). The average 
time required for processing is then computed over all the 
measurements, including the filtered measurements, which 
greatly matches with results in experiment 3. 
Experiment 3. We evaluate additional computation 
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Fig. 9. Running time of the MRBT vs. RBT on the client side
(transformation only) for s10. The average times required 
for MRBT and RBT are 20.78 ms and 19.8910 ms,
respectively. 
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overhead represented as time and required for the MRBT over 
the RBT. As shown in Fig. 9, for a dataset of 31,250 records 
transformed using the MRBT at m=100, we found that the 
additional computation required in MRBT is slight compared 
to the initial overhead required in RBT. While RBT requires 
19.8910 ms, the MRBT requires 20.7804 ms for the same 
dataset. The extra time in MRBT over the time required in 
RBT is 0.8894 ms, which is 4.47% of the overall overhead. 
Though this overhead is small in relation with merit realized in 
MRBT, it is even smaller for larger datasets.  
Experiment 4. In this experiment, we generated normally 
distributed synthesis data which has a statistical mean equal to 
its variance (μ=σ2=100). The dataset has 106 records and each 
record has 10 attributes (about 130 MB on a desk). We 
transformed the dataset using the RBT to measure its feasibility. 
We realized that transforming the whole dataset takes about 
1.601 seconds. In the same dataset, MRBT with m=100, took 
1.614 seconds, which is about 0.88% additional overhead. 
Experiment 5. We observed that required computation 
overhead for transforming data in the ARBT, as shown in steps 
1 and 2 of Fig. 2, are equal to the overhead required in MRBT. 
Furthermore, we observed that the computational overheard 
required for step 3 in Fig. 2 is equal to that required in the RBT 
scheme for half of the dataset over which conventional 
clustering is to be performed. For instance, if a dataset is 
divided into two parts, then transformed using ARBT and re-
transformed to enable conventional cluster, the overall 
computation overhead required at the client side is one and a 
half times of the overheard required in the RBT or the MRBT 
(since both schemes require almost the same amount of 
overhead). However, compared to the naive scenario described 
in section IV.3, ARBT requires only half of the overhead 
required for further data transformation. 
 
Fig. 10. Number of iterations for achieving stabilized clusters for 
random vs. sequential selection of initial centroids 
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Fig. 11. Time required for achieving stabilized clusters. 
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Experiment 6. We learned the impact of initial centroids on 
the number of required iterations for the Lloyd algorithm used 
for computing final clusters. We studied the case of random 
against sequential centroid assignment. Figure 10 shows the 
number of iterations required for data subsets in Table 4. We 
realized that though the random selection of initial centroids 
does not necessarily reduce the number of iterations as shown 
for small data subsets, it reduces the overhead when the 
number of records to be clustered is large. For instance, the 
average number of iterations required in the random scenario is 
23.2727 iterations per dataset, while it is 24.2727 per dataset 
for sequential scenario with the final clusters k=7. 
Experiment 7. The previous experiment was performed 
again to measure the time required for clustering datasets in 
both of the random and sequential assignment scenarios. We 
realized that the average time required for clustering a set for 
the random scenario is 6,620.4 ms, while it is 7,980 ms for the 
sequential assignment scenario. A comparison between the two 
scenarios for the different datasets is shown in Fig. 11. 
Experiment 8 (AK-ICA on ARBT-1). We studied the 
impact of the AK-ICA attack on ARBT. Particularly, we 
considered the scenario where several percents of all possible 
data subset pairs (that is, m–1 for safety) are transformed to 
enable the conventional clustering and measured the mitigation  
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Table 5. Impact of AK-ICA attack on ARBT for different percents of
private data known to attacker and transformed subsets
(initial m = 100 and final m = 50). 
Known  
percent MRBT 25% 50% 75% 100% 
Mitigation 
(5%) 0.970 0.835 0.724 0.590 0.251 
Mitigation 
(10%) 0.963 0.817 0.698 0.531 0.220 
Table 6. Impact of AK-ICA attack on ARBT for different percents of
private data known to attacker and transformed subsets
(initial m = 200 and final m = 100). 
Known  
percent MRBT 25% 50% 75% 100% 
Mitigation 
(5%) 0.981 0.978 0.977 0.973 0.972 
Mitigation 
(10%) 
0.974 0.971 0.970 0.968 0.965 
 
of the AK-ICA attack on the resulting dataset for fixed percent 
of known private data to an attacker. In this experiment, we 
considered the whole banker dataset and m=100. We also set 
initial percents of known private data to the attacker (as 5% and 
10%) and studied the impact of AK-ICA on ARBT when 
different portions of data are transformed. The results of this 
experiment are shown in Table 5. Note that MRBT indicates 
0% of the subsets are transformed using ARBT. Also, 100% 
for all two-subset pairs (that is, m–1) in ARBT is equivalent to 
the case of MRBT at m=50 [4]. Though the error of the 
attacker’s estimation of the private data is relatively lower than 
that achieved by MRBT, a degree of mitigation of the AK-ICA 
attack is possible when applying ARBT. 
Experiment 9 (AK-ICA on ARBT-2). We repeated the 
previous experiment with different initial parameters of MRBT. 
We initially set m=200 and performed the same experiment for 
the same percents of known private data to the attacker against 
the same percents of transformed pairs of data subsets using the 
ARBT. The mitigation degree of the AK-ICA attack is shown 
in Table 6, where the final value of m is 100 if all pairs of 
subsets (m–1) are transformed using ARBT. From this  
experiment we conclude that ARBT provides high mitigation 
of the AK-ICA attack for carefully assigned parameters. 
Experiment 10 (Optimization of ARBT). To test the 
optimization scenario described in Fig. 3, we performed this 
experiment and compared the result to the naive scenario in 
which the user transforms both of the original two subsets 
using a single parameter at the same time and releases them to 
the miner. On the miner side, the whole procedure of the     
k-mean clustering is performed. In this experiment, we realized 
that clustering s10 in our ARBT scheme can save up to 32% of 
the computation overhead. More precisely, while the naive 
scenario takes 14.7 seconds for clustering s10, the optimization 
scenario for RBT takes only 9.96 seconds. 
VI. Conclusion 
In this article, we introduced the ARBT that enables 
conventional clustering over data transformed using MRBT. To 
improve its applicability for data clustering, we introduced an 
enhanced clustering algorithm that considers the scenarios of 
ARBT deployment where some of the data transformed using 
ARBT is already clustered. Unlike RBT and MRBT, the 
ARBT scheme both mitigates the AK-ICA attack and enables 
conventional data clustering.  
To show the feasibility of the different transformation 
schemes, we introduced an extensive experimental study using 
the ppCD toolkit. This study concluded that the overhead 
required for mitigating the AK-ICA attack, in both of ARBT 
and MRBT, is almost negligible on the server side. Also, it 
showed that all transformation schemes are very feasible on 
typical computing machines even for large datasets. 
Since this study considered only empirical measurements for 
the impact of the AK-ICA, which is a necessary contribution 
for understanding the behavior of the different transformation 
schemes, in the near future we will investigate the development 
of mathematical framework that expresses the relationship 
between the AK-ICA attack, its mitigation level, and the 
different parameters of the ARBT. 
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